On Wed, 27 Jan 2010 10:00:26 +0100, "Michele"
wrote:
>>>It's just that it's like throwing three times 12 on two dice.
>>>
>> I dunno - I can think of several people who would have been more
>> gullible than FDR in 1939-41 - Lindburgh and Wheeler both come to mind
>> here. Switch William Lyon Mackenzie King and FDR at pretty much any
>> point after 1935 and you get a very different war.
>
>Of course. That would be one throw of the dice. The difficult thing is
>having it several times in a row.
I spent a LOT of time on wargames back in the 1980s so trust me I
understand the concept of rolling the dice!
>> Had Chamberlain been in good health in May 1940 and there had been no
>> Norwegian campaign he might well have clung to power. Then what? (I'd
>> argue the two main effects of that campaign was (1) to decimate the
>> German Navy to the point that Sealion was beyond implausible in
>> September 1940 while making the U-boat campaign more successful
>> long-term and (2) totally destroy what was left of Chamberlain's and
>> Daladier's credibility)
>>
>
>Note I did not write "someone more feckless than Churchill", I wrote
>"someone more feckless than Chamberlain". Chamberlain himself will not want
>to sign a peace with Hitler. The Norwegian campaign is not very relevant to
>the plausibility of Seelöwe. Yes, the Kriegsmarine had been further weakened
>by it; no, with all theets it would have without it, it still wouldn't
>overcome the Royal Navy. It still would be in the order of the 20:1 ratio of
>power. If they really want to make sure, the British can easily postpone the
>West African sideshow and lighten the Gibraltar/Med forces.
There's "implausible" and "beyond implausible" - Sealion with the
pre-Norway Kriegsmarine is implausible; with the post-Norway
Kriegsmarine it's beyond implausible. Two different levels of "you've
got to be sh**ting me" - neither is likely...
>> Do you think someone like Gabriel D'annunzio would have been more
>> prudent than Mussolini? Bear in mind that Mussolini in June 1940 did
>> not expect to be at war in December 1940 - he expected an early peace
>> and was in a hurry to grab what he could before what he regarded as an
>> early peace conference.
>
>Exactly, in other words he accepted the risk. Gabriele D'Annunzio would be
>even more imprudent than Mussolini; besides, he would not have survived the
>drudgery of ordinary administration between 1922 and 1940.
>Italo Balbo comes to mind; certainly Mussolini preferred him not to be in
>Rome. He's flashy and Fascist enough, and prone to violence, but he might be
>shrewder. Additionally, see below...
>
>> Certainly virtually no one besides Mussolini would have invaded
>> Abyssinia in the first place and without that invasion Italy in 1940
>> is in a position to treat with both sides as in 1914-15.
>
>So the point would be when Mussolini is replaced. Which goes back to the
>point above; Balbo might be impulsive, but suppose he replaces Mussolini in
>1938 or 1939. He might wish to jump into the war - but will his position be
>secure enough in 1940? Can he risk an adventure, having just stepped in the
>shoes of Benito?
More to the point, who besides Mussolini would have entered into a
full alliance with Hitler? "Pact of Steel" sounds impressive but it
was never as tight an alliance as say the modern Canada-US Free Trade
Agreement much less the current version of the Rome treaty.
>> Of course the big what if is whether Britain has a leader in
>> July-August 1940 who can rally the nation like Churchill. Somehow I
>> don't see Attlee or Macmillan being that man in 1940.
>
>Yet, it is one thing no tbeing able to rally the nation, it is another to be
>willing a peace deal with Hitler.
So you presumably would consider an example of 'not being able to
rally the nation' to be what? The response of the British government
to say Chanak or Suez in 1956?
>In any case, one would still need all these three players - Italy, Britain
>and the USA - much more inclined to peace than historically. It's what we
>call multiple PODs around here, right?
Heh heh. Yep. Though other than complete occupation (as in 1945) it is
difficult to see how you get peace with an unwilling Germany.
Bottom line is what Hitler would have considered a victory is not what
most of us would. Most of us would consider the pre-war boundary in
the west coupled with the Brest-Litovsk boundaries of Germany in the
east to be a German victory. (Particularly when coupled with a
pro-German Ukraine as seemed to be the case immediately post
Brest-Litovsk before the Civil War got under way) In 1941 it is
doubtful whether Hitler would have.
Greek literature is full of the twin concepts of hubris and nemesis.
Other than Macbeth I don't know of too much in the English language
that touches on that theme yet so much of our modern history shows it
clearly. |
