On Tue, 09 Mar 2010 22:56:05 -0800, THG wrote:
>On Tue, 09 Mar 2010 21:33:34 +1100, Phil McGregor
> wrote:
>
>>>> In fact, one of the reasons why Hitler was able to do France in 1940
>>>> was because of the *stockpiles* he'd captured in Poland and acquired
>>>> in Czechoslovakia being enough, along with the small amounts
>>>> produced
>>>> by both those countries, to fuel the invasion ... or so I have read
>>>> over the years in a couple of places.
>>>
>>>Sounds credible, but that's before Rumanian oil became available, of
>>>course.
>>
>>No. Even after. Rumanian oil was, even with supplies from the USSR,
>>never enough to meet demand.
>>
>>Evidently German stocks declined steadily from 1941 onwards to the
>>point where, by late 1944, any "surplus" that the German records
>>showed were, thanks to Speer's book-keeping (lying, basically), merely
>>current production in transit. There were, essentially, no reserves at
>>all. Even with Rumanian oil.
>>
>>Losing the Ploesti fields was, of course, the last straw.
>
>It is difficult to imagine anything the Germans would consider victory
>without Ploesti firmly in German hands.
>
>Even Ploesti glowing in the dark with the rest of Europe in German
>hands doesn't feel much like Germany to me.
>
>Certainly even with both Ploesti and the Caucasian fields in German
>hands they are hardpressed to outdo a fully mobilized United States.
>
>Again for the umpteenth time, it is not enough for Germany to take the
>Caucasian oilfields (or the Iraqi fields for that matter). The
>important goal is transporting the oil to German factories which is a
>much harder job.
>
>I know you understand this Phil - it's Al and several others who
>somehow have the idea that 1000 barrels in Baku is just as good as
>1000 barrels in Berlin. T'ain't so and you know it!
Indeed. Though I think Al, at least, sorta knows it.
Phil |
