"Les" wrote:
>fasquardon wrote:
>> I'm not sure even the Japanese would declare war on the Westerners in
>> this scenario, one of the major reasons they went ahead with tearing
>> off some chunks off the European colonies OTL was the Italians and
>> Germans were (apparently) knocking seven bells out of (and very
>> effectively distracting) the people who owned the colonies in the
>> area...
>
>They invaded the USSR when it was not involved in any European
>conflict. Twice.
>
>Even their first effort was not a success. Their second effort could
>generously be described as a disaster.
>
>Local commanders were still murmuring about trying it a third time.
Both efforts were free-lance operations by
local commanders. At no time was Japan formally
committed to full-scale war.
>Now, it is likely both invasions against the USSR were the result of
>the local army hotheads acting on their own accord.
Not likely. Certain. This is well-documented.
>However, Japan's
>own alleged leaders decided to attack the US while it was not formally
>engaged in European hostilities, as well as the UK and Netherlands to
>boot.
This decision came after Japan's previous
aggressions (including the occupation of
Indochina while France could not resist)
caused the U.S. to respond with the oil
embargo, and Japan had to fish or cut bait.
>I do not see WW2 Japan as rational when it comes to how they see
>their strategic position. Given their pre-1941 behavior, they are
>destined to involve themselves in a war against everyone else sooner or
>later.
Perhaps. But one should realize that the decision
to go to war usually requires an extraordinary surge
or peak in driving forces. The churn of events kicks
up such surges, but the vast majority fall well short
of starting a war. As with any distribution, the frequency
drops _way_ off when one approaches the extreme. It takes
a lot more "historical energy" to go from "near war" to
"at war", more than it does to get to near war.
Waves lapping at a waterfront. Sometimes the waves
splash to near the top. And yet they don't flow over -
unless a real storm blows.
The confidence of the potential belligerents is one of
the 'driving forces'. By 1941, Japan had nothing to fear
from France, Britain was thoroughly distracted, and the
US was on the other side of the Pacific. So they could
believe they could pull it off. If France and Britain
are not out of the picture, it gets much more difficult
for Japan to nerve themselves to try anything.
--
| He had a shorter, more scraggly, and even less |
| flattering beard than Yassir Arafat, and Escalante |
| never conceived that such a thing was possible. |
| -- William Goldman, _Heat_ | |
